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Abstract
There have been a number of studies conducted in relation to data remaining on disks purchased on the second
hand market. A large number of these studies have indicated that a proportion of these disks contain a degree of
residual data placed on the drive by the original owners. The Security Research Centre at BT has sponsored a
residual data study over the last five years examining disks sourced around the globe, in the UK, USA, Germany
France and Australia. In 2008 as part of a 5 year study, Glamorgan University in conjunction with Edith Cowan
University in Australia, Longwood University in Virginia USA and the BT Security Research Centre completed
the fourth annual disk study aimed at assessing the volume and nature of information that remains on computer
hard disks offered for sale on the second hand market. One of the main findings of the study was the high
proportion of disks that are sold in a non-functioning state. As in both previous and following years a
percentage of the hard disks examined in the 2008 study failed the imaging process and were marked as faulty.
This paper describes further analysis of a number of these faulty drives from the UK sample set of the 2008
study. This paper details the analysis of non-functioning disks supplied to the University of Glamorgan to
determine the ease with which data can be recovered from these drives using specialist recovery tools. It
discusses implications for both computer forensics and information security practices and procedures.
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INTRODUCTION
There are numerous studies examining the way in which data can be recovered from computer hard disks for
which the correct disposal action has not been taken (Garfinkel (2003), Sutherland (2006). During the last three
years the University of Glamorgan in conjunction with Edith Cowan University in Australia, Longwood
University in the USA and BT, has participated in a study of the data that remained on second hand hard disks
(Jones et al, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2010). The disk study project had been conducted in order to obtain an
understanding of the amounts and types of information that remained on disks that had been offered for sale on
the second hand market through various channels including online auctions.
The methodology employed for the disk study involved the purchase of a sample set of disks, in the case of the
UK set in 2008 this was in the order of 133 disks, obtained from computer fairs, computer auctions or via online
auction sites. The disks were purchased individually or in small batches, discretely obtained by a number of
buyers. These disks were acquired by the project sponsor British Telecommunications (BT) Limited. The disks
were a mixture of the form factors (the 3.5 inch desktop or 2.5 inch laptop drives) although a few smaller
versions commonly used in devices such as the Apple iPod were also present in the sample. The disks were then
supplied ‘blind’ to the researchers responsible for the imaging and analysis with no indication of where they had
been sourced and identified only by a manufacturers label and a unique sequential serial number.
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In the disk study, the disk drives were forensically analysed with the objective of determining whether the disks
had been effectively cleansed of data or whether they still contained information that was either visible or easily
recoverable, and if there was sufficient information to identify an organisation or individual. The research to date
has indicated that a large proportion of the disks examined that could be accessed, still contained information
pertaining to a previous owner of the disk. The information recovered could be considered of a sensitive nature
to the original organisation or individual. The analysis used standard forensic good practice procedures as
defined in the UK Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) Good Practice Guide for Computer-Based
Electronic Evidence45. Analysis was performed on a forensic copy of the drive, with the original disk being
securely stored. The analysis methods used standard commercial tools and depending on the disk recovered
information either from a file system remaining on the drive or from unallocated space by methods such as data
carving.
The 2008 research also highlighted that a number of the disks failed during the imaging process; of the 133 disks
analysed at Glamorgan for the 2008 disk study a total of 57 disks (44.19%) of the disks were faulty in some way.
The figure of 57 disks does not include those that successfully imaged, but with a high rate of errors, which
would be replaced with zeros in the image. The figure of 57 disks represents the number that failed to complete
the imaging process using either Encase or FTK Imager, the main commercial forensic tools in use in the
University of Glamorgan Forensics Laboratory. Prior to discussing the analysis and recovery of some these disks
and considering the implications to computer forensics we outline some of the key features of hard disk
technology and possible failures.

HARD DISK TECHNOLOGY
The hard disk remains the most popular form of digital storage media used in computer systems. The disk drive
may be housed either within the system unit, a removable caddy or an external housing connected by either
Firewire or USB. Current conventional computer hard disks are electro-mechanical devices. In addition to the
Printed Circuit Board (PCB) the drive contains a number of moving parts: one or more metal, ceramic or glass
platters coated with a magnetic thin film oxide (the data storage area within the disk), voice coils, motor,
mountings and an armature with a separate head assembly for each disk surface. A specific sector (the smallest
addressable unit) can be addressed by using the cylinder address (C) the Head (H) and the Sector (S). These
mechanical components interact with very small tolerances and consequently are susceptible to damage from
sudden movements, for instance the type of shock that occurs when a disk is dropped, even a relatively short
distance. Some of the latest generation of disks contain integrated sensors on the PCB that detect sudden
movements and automatically park the read/write heads in the event of an accidental fall. Once the heads are in
the parked position some disks are rated to withstand shocks of up to 350G (Maxtor DiamondMax 20). Disks are
therefore surprising robust in some cases but fragile in other cases.
Work conducted by Schroeder & Gibson (2007) suggested that disk independent factors in the form of operating
conditions, usage and environmental factors affect the rate of failure rather than component failures resulting
from the use of different types of disks, a conclusion supported by Pinheiro (2007). Problems may result from
either mechanical or chemical failure, common issues highlighted in table 1 below.
Failure Class
Mechanical
failures

Example
Failure
Spindle jam
Head crash

Physical damage

Impact/ Shock

Disk
contamination

Description
This may result due to wear and tear on a pre-existing manufacturing
defect – Semi-defective spindle bearing.
Insufficient airflow to maintain an air bearing between the head and the
disk platter. This can occur due to a high impact during operation or a
power failure. This can commonly occur as the disk powers down and
result in the head failing to part correctly
Incorrect handling and storage can cause damage to the disk. Physical
damage to the circuit board can also result from a harsh working
environment (Schroeder 2005)
Disks operate using very fine tolerances. The disk head travels over the
surface of the drive at a distance of 0.00015 of an inch. Opening a disk in
normal conditions can result in a degree of contamination that will
eventually result in drive failure.

45

Association of Chief Police Officers Good Practice Guide for Computer-Based Electronic Evidence,
http://www.7safe.com/electronic_evidence/ACPO_guidelines_computer_evidence.pdf
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Chemical

Chemical

Electrical

Surge/
Component
failure
Failure

Firmware/
Service area

A disk operating in a humid atmosphere may experience some
deterioration in the electrical connectors between the circuit board on the
disk
Damage to voice coil, spindle motor can occur as a result of power surges.

Corruption of the firmware area may result due to incorrect storage but
can also result due to the age of the device. It may also occur during disk
use as firmware commands/modules corrupt the device
Table 1: Disk Failure

It should also be noted that some of the faults discussed above may arise as a result of malicious user activity or
could also be the result of wear and tear on the disks.

FAULTY DRIVES PURCHASED IN THE 2008 DISK STUDY
The disks that were purchased as part of the disk study and that arrived in a faulty state could be as a result of
three possibilities, each of which has a potential impact as to whether data had been removed from the drive:
1) The disk was sold in a working state and damaged in transit as a result of some form of kinetic shock.
In this case the disks may or may not have had data removed.
2) The disk was knowingly sold in a faulty state after suffering some form of mechanical or electrical
failure. In this case it is likely the user would not have had the opportunity to remove data from the
disk.
3) The disk failed during its last use by the previous owner and was sold unknowingly in a faulty state. In
this case the disks may or may not have had data removed.
Although the third option is a possibility, based on the number of drives faulty in the disk studies and the number
of reliable power on / power off cycles, it is considered more likely that either the disks were damaged in transit
or failed prior to being offered for sale. Most hard disks in a powered down and parked state are able to
withstand a degree of mechanical shock. Although it should be noted that a number of disks that were obtained
for the study were inadequately packaged when shipped from their previous owner. We therefore suggest that
that it is reasonable to conclude that the majority of disks are most likely to fall into the second category those
disks that have been knowingly sold in a faulty or failed state. If this is the case then the owners are unlikely to
have had the opportunity to remove their data from the disk. A seller may be of the opinion that if they are
unable to access the contents of a drive then neither can anyone else.

HYPOTHESIS
Based on these assumptions we suggest that comparing the sample of faulty drives in the disk study to those of
the working disks; overall the faulty drives are more likely to contain user data and that provided the drives can
be returned to a working state this data can probably be accessed.

HARD DISK FAILURE
A disk was considered faulty if the drive failed to spin up normally and present itself as a working disk to FTK
imager, therefore resulting in it being not possible to access the disks using normal forensic tools. The disks
when powered up for analysis and connected to a write-blocker displayed a variety of symptoms varying from
spinning up (based on slight vibrations and an audible check), in some a rhythmic clicking of the disk heads,
others produced no activity suggesting some form of electrical failure.
In one example, a disk from the 2008 disk study (07GB053) was reported as making an electronic pinging noise,
similar to early ‘space invaders’ games when powered on. A visual inspection of the exterior of the disk revealed
a slight dent in the upper cover in the area where the disk head traversed the platters of the disk. The disk was
opened and it was determined that the read/write head was located in the centre of the platter rather than in the
‘parked’ position. As a result the depression in the outer case had resulted in one of the read/write heads
becoming wedged on the disk surface. When power was supplied to the disk and it attempted to carry out the
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initial read / seek this resulted in the voice coil46 causing the pinging sound. The disk platters were manually
rotated and the head moved back to the parked position. The disk was then powered on and after a single ‘ping’
the normal start up ‘seek’ sequence was performed with the heads travelling across the surface of he platter as
normal.
However, subsequent attempts to recover data from the disk failed as it did not present itself as ready to
accept/process ATA commands. The conclusion was that either the delicate read/write head mechanism had
been damaged in some way as a result of it being forced down onto the surface of the platter, or that the disk
spindle /platters had been distorted, although there was no visible damage to either the platters or disk heads.
A laser pointer was used to check for distortion on the platters. The resulting elliptical path of the reflected laser
beam suggested that the spindle hand been bent out of place and that this disk could only be recovered by
relocating the disk platters into a new chassis, assuming the platter themselves had not been damaged. In this
study, due to the difficulty in obtaining matching donor parts and to provide an idea of the capability of a user
with access to only the equipment, repairs type 1 and 2 (Table 2) were applied so no further work was carried out
on this disk.
It was determined that the faulty disks examined in the study could be divided into four classes in terms of the
possible disk repair and data recovery, based on the skills and technology required.

Type
1
2
3
4

Repair
A simple mechanical fix, requiring no specialist tools or donor parts. Typically this would be
resetting the disk head / parking the disk head / PCB repair.
Recovery using specialist tools either to image a failing disk drive or to repair disk firmware.
A complex mechanical fix requiring the use of donor parts to replace or rebuild faulty mechanical
components of the disk.
No repairs possible
Table 2: Disk Repair

FAILED DISK ANALYSIS
The disks that did not image in the 2008 study were separated into SCSI and IDE drives, with the recovery tools
available, this study focussed on the IDE drives which provide a sample size of 32 hard disks. The 32 faulty IDE
disks were examined and none of the drives were determined to be type 1 drives, rather 10 drives (31% of the
IDE disks) were identified as being type 2 and 20 (63%) drives were identified as being type 3 drives, requiring
donor parts to return them to an operational state. Only 2 (6%) disk drives were judged to be irreparable, the
pinging disk (07GB053) discussed above and one other disk drive which had undergone a head-crash which had
caused significant damage to the disk platters.
The 10 type 2 drives were further analysed to determine the degree of data, if possible, that could be extracted
from the disk drives. A more detailed analysis indicated that 3 (9%) of the disks were either partially supported
by the recovery equipment and so could not be analysed further. The 7 disks (22%) that disks that could be
repaired displayed two main problems: Either the need for a specialised interface and jumper requirements (4
disks) or varying degrees of firmware corruption (3 disks).

Restored Disk Results
Once the drives had been restored to enable access to the drive contents it was possible to determine that 2 of the
7 (29% of the restored disks) were wiped and that the remaining 5 (71% of the restored disks) contained varying
degrees of data. This is in comparison to the 2008 disk study results where 31% of the readable disks were wiped
and 69% contained data.
The data recovered from the restored drives included music, password files, surfing histories and for one
company; financial contracts, work proposals, client details, email and attachments. Overall the results are
broadly similar to the analysis of working disks in the 2008 study, but the sample size of 7 restored disks is very
46

In a modern hard disk, the actuator uses a device called a voice coil to move the read/write head arms back and forward
across the surface of the platters. The voice coil is operated by using electromagnetic attraction and repulsion.
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small. Therefore future work will focus on the restoration of drives classed as type 3 (requiring spare parts) to
determine if this makes a significant difference to the number of drives containing data.

CONCLUSION
The implications of this work suggest that disks that are found to be faulty and which fail to spin up or cannot be
recognised by the operating system may not be truly ‘dead’. A significant number of these disks can be restored
and users with access to the appropriate tools and technology can then recover the data with relative ease. Many
forensic investigators already utilise data recovery tools to recover potential evidence, however there may be
other users with less honourable intentions.
Although the majority of the specialist tools described in this paper can be acquired for between a few hundred
and a few thousand pounds, in terms of the threat vectors it is more likely to be commercial competitors from a
large organisation, or nation states engaged in commercial espionage and is less likely to be from private
individuals due to the cost and time involved in some of the recovery techniques.
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